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  2 
WATER	  RIGHTS	  AND	  MARKET-­‐BASED	  REALLOCATION	  
In the western United States (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming), water rights are based on appropriations of a fixed amount of water from a river for beneficial 
use, essentially putting a public resource to private use. In times of shortage, claims on surface water are 
satisfied in the order in which they were established: the longest-standing (senior) claims are completely 
filled at the expense of more recent (junior) claims, although the latter are protected from enlargement of 
existing rights or other changing uses that would affect existing claims. Water rights can also be 
transferred. Western water rights define an ownership interest that has characteristics similar to traditional 
notions of property rights (Anderson and Snyder 1997).  
 
The prevailing view of property rights is that they are a collection of relationships between property 
owners and society at large that define or constrain what may be done with an item of private property 
(Penner 1996). The metaphor often used to describe property rights is a “bundle of sticks” (di Robilant 
2013). The bundle represents the collection of liberties, claim-rights, powers, and immunities that define 
what it means to own property (e.g., right to possess, right to manage, right to security, liberty to waste or 
destroy) (Honre 1961). Because the bundle of sticks is well defined and transferable, property rights also 
provide the basis for market exchanges. Thus, by treating water in the western United States as property, 
markets are viewed as an effective instrument to reallocate water to the highest-valued uses.  
 
Developing new water rights to keep pace with population growth in urban areas of the western United 
States is increasingly difficult. Since the 1970s, economists, environmentalists, and others have called for 
water rights markets for three reasons (Hartman and Seastone 1970; Johnson et al. 1981; Anderson 1983; 
Howe et al. 1986; Roos-Collins 1986; Saliba 1987; Gould 1988). First, water is more economically 
valued in urban settings than in agricultural settings, suggesting that farmers could often make more 
money selling their water to cities than they could selling their crops. Studies have estimated municipal 
wholesale prices to be anywhere from eight times to tens of thousands times higher than agricultural 
water values for comparable water (Brewer et al. 2008). Second, market transactions have been used for 
environmental protection by retiring irrigation water to create instream flows (Landry 1998; Neuman 
2004). Third, governments have recognized the potential for market transfers. The U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation (BOR) identified market-based transfers as “an important tool for resolving imbalances” in 
supply and demand of Colorado River water (BOR 2012, 82), and it is the policy of the Western 
Governers Association that states should promote voluntary water transfers from agricultural to other uses 
(Western Governors Association 2012).  
 
Despite the rhetoric, market transfers of water rights from agriculture users to urban or environmental 
uses have been relatively few (Young 1986; Brajer et al. 1989; Dellapenna 2005). These transfers face 
two hurdles that complicate water markets: third-party effects and irrigation institutions. The third-party 
effect arises because one user’s “bundle of sticks” must be disentangled from many other users’ bundles 
before a water right can be transferred. Irrigation institutions create the effect of multiple users claiming 
shared ownership of a right, as if several hands were all legitimately gripping one bundle of sticks. These 
inescapable hurdles reflect the hydrologic and institutional connectedness of water users, arise because of 
the method by which property rights in water are defined, and create transaction costs that add time and 
money to any water transfer.  
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INTERTWINED	  BUNDLES	  OF	  STICKS	  
Nearly all of the prior appropriation water rights involve diverting water for off-stream uses, but only 
some of the diverted water is actually consumed, while the remainder is returned to the river. Water is 
“consumed” through evaporation; incorporated into plants, animals, or manufactured products; or 
exported into a different watershed. The water diverted but not consumed is returned through a sewer 
outfall, drainage ditch, or groundwater flow and is available for use by downstream users. Diverters with 
low consumptive use (relative to total diversion) are more hydraulically connected to downstream users 
than those with high consumptive use because a larger portion of their diversion may already be “spoken 
for” by downstream users. Changes to a water right can affect the water that another downstream user 
already has a claim on, effectively connecting the two rights and entangling their bundles of sticks.  
The amount of diverted water actually consumed, or entanglement of bundles of sticks, varies by use. In 
the western states, thermoelectric power generation using once-through cooling technology consumes less 
than 5% of water diverted for that purpose (Figure 1, Table 1). Municipal, household, commercial, and 
industrial uses account for just over one-quarter of all diversions but also consume very little of the water 
diverted (14%). Agriculture accounts for the largest amount of water diverted. Regionally, 67% of 
diversions go to agriculture, but in some states, agriculture accounts for as much as 97% of diverted 
water. However, irrigated agriculture only consumes slightly more than half of the water that it diverts. 
The most consumptive use is thermoelectric power generation using closed-loop cooling technology. 
Although this use consumes nearly 70% of its diversions, it accounts for only 2% of regional diversions. 
Overall in the western United States, only 69 million acre feet (MAF) of the 141 MAF diverted is 
consumptively used.1 More than half the water diverted under prior appropriation ends up returned to 
rivers, potentially to be diverted by other downstream users, effectively creating hydrologic connections 
among water users. 
	   	  
                                                      
1 An acre-foot is the common unit of volume reference in western water and is equal to 325,851 gallons or 1,233 cubic meters. 
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Figure	  1.	  Ranges	  of	  Consumptive	  Use	  by	  Sector	  in	  the	  Western	  United	  States.	  
 
Sources:	  Data	  from	  USGS	  2009;	  USGS	  1998;	  and	  Averyt	  et	  al.	  2013.	  See	  Table	  1	  for	  the	  data	  used	  to	  create	  this	  figure.	  
Note:	  The	  crosses	  indicate	  the	  regional	  consumptive	  use	  and	  percentage	  of	  surface	  water	  use	  accounted	  for	  by	  each	  use	  type.	  
The	  boxes	  indicate	  variability	  among	  the	  17	  states	  and	  show	  the	  interquartile	  range	  of	  the	  consumptive	  use	  percent	  and	  the	  
percent	  of	  surface	  water	  from	  the	  states.	  M&I (municipal	  and	  industrial) includes	  municipal,	  household,	  commercial,	  and	  
industrial	  uses.
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Table	  1.	  State-­‐by-­‐State	  Breakdown	  of	  Amount	  of	  Water	  Diverted	  and	  Consumptively	  Used	  by	  Different	  Sectors.	  
	  
Total	  
Municipal,Household,	  
Commerical,	  and	  
Industriala	  
Irrigation	   Aquaculture	  
Thermoelectric	  
Cooling	  (Once	  
Through)	  
Thermoelectric	  Cooling	  
(Reciruculating)	  
Fresh-­‐
water	  
diverted	  
(con-­‐
sumed)	  
(MAF)b	  
%	  of	  
total	  
sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
use	  
	  
%	  of	  
freshwater	  
diverstions	  
consump-­‐
tively	  usedc	  
%	  of	  
total	  
sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
use	  
	  
%	  of	  
freshwater	  
diverstions	  
consump-­‐
tively	  usedc	  
%	  of	  
total	  
sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
use	  
	  
%	  of	  
freshwater	  
diverstions	  
consumptively	  
usedc	  
%	  of	  
total	  
sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
use	  	  
	  
%	  of	  
freshwater	  
diverstions	  
consump-­‐
tively	  usedc	  
%	  of	  
total	  
sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
use	  
	  
%	  of	  
freshwater	  
diverstions	  
consump-­‐
tively	  usedc	  
Arizona	   6.1	  (3.4)	   56%	   19%	   79%	   56%	  
0.070
%	   100%	   0%	   4.5%	   1.2%	   67%	  
California	   32	  (23)	   26%	   26%	   71%	   81%	   2.1%	   20%	   0%	   0.64%	   0.18%	   83%	  
Colorado	   12	  (4.7)	   28%	   8.2%	   90%	   39%	   0.64%	   0%	   0.64%	   3.4%	   0.41%	   69%	  
Idaho	   12	  (3.9)	   2.4%	   0.32%	   84%	   33%	   16%	   0%	   0%	   0%	   0%	   71%	  
Kansas	   4.7	  (3.2)	   59%	   30%	   14%	   95%	   0.38%	   92%	   49%	   3.9%	   3.9%	   68%	  
Montana	   7.9	  (1.7)	   36%	   1.1%	   97%	   21%	   0.40%	   100%	   0.62%	   0.69%	   0.29%	   68%	  
Nebraska	   9.4	  (6.3)	   44%	   1.9%	   24%	   89%	   1.5%	   7.6%	   72%	   1.5%	   0%	   68%	  
Nevada	   2.0	  (1.2)	   40%	   39%	   59%	   64%	  
0.048
%	   0%	   0%	   0.66%	   1.5%	   69%	  
New	  Mexico	   3.1	  (1.8)	   56%	   2.4%	   93%	   56%	   1.1%	   0%	   0%	   4.5%	   2.7%	   69%	  
North	  
Dakota	   1.0	  (0.16)	   34%	   3.8%	   6.1%	   90%	   0.52%	   0%	   87%	   4.0%	   2.2%	   69%	  
Oklahoma	   1.6	  (0.64)	   18%	   56%	   14%	   46%	   1.9%	   0%	   2.8%	   4.2%	   14%	   70%	  
Oregon	   7.0	  (2.9)	   6.2%	   12%	   74%	   50%	   13%	   100%	   0%	   4.5%	   0.15%	   77%	  
South	  
Dakota	  
0.41	  
(0.22)	   19%	   15%	   62%	   65%	   6.1%	   0%	   0%	   4.5%	   1.7%	   68%	  
Texas	   22	  (9.4)	   29%	   26%	   11%	   86%	   0.058
%	  
98%	   52%	   3.5%	   9.3%	   71%	  
Utah	   3.8	  (2.0)	   35%	   7.0%	   91%	   55%	  
0.005
%	   0.56%	   0%	   0%	   1.1%	   69%	  
Washington	   7.9	  (2.7)	   13%	   19%	   69%	   43%	   0.74%	   100%	   10%	   0%	   0.72%	   66%	  
Wymonig	   6.3	  (2.5)	  	   41%	   1.2%	   92%	   40%	   0.54%	   6.4%	   4.2%	   0.69%	   1.5%	   68%	  
Region	   141	  (69)	   26%	   14%	   67%	   59%	   3.6%	   3.2%	   13%	   2.0%	   1.9%	   70%	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Surface	  
water	  
diverted	  
(MAF)d	  
Sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
divert
ed	  
(MAF)d	  
	  
	  
Freshwater	  
diverted	  
(consumed)	  
(MAF)e	  
Sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
divert
ed	  
(MAF)d	  
	  
	  
Freshwater	  
diverted	  
(consumed)	  
(MAF)f	  
Sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
divert
ed	  
(MAF)d	  
	  
	  
Freshwater	  
diverted	  
(consumed)	  
(MAF)g	  
Sur-­‐	  
face	  
water	  
divert
ed	  
(MAFh	  
	  
Freshwater	  
diverted	  
(consumed)	  
(MAF)g	  
Sur-­‐
face	  
water	  
di-­‐
erted	  
(MAF)	  
	  
	  
Freshwater	  
diverted	  
(consumed)	  
(MAF)	  
Arizona	   3.5	   0.67	   0.74	  (0.41)	   2.9	   5.1	  (2.8)	   5.1	  
0.0005	  
(0.0005)	   0	   0.10	  (0.005)	   0.044	   0.26	  (0.17)	  
California	   25	   6.5	   5.4	  (1.4)	   18	   26	  (21)	   26	   0.14	  (0.028)	   0	   6.3	  (0.040)	   0.045	   0.11	  (0.088)	  
Colorado	   12	   1.0	   0.69	  (0.19)	   11	   11	  (4.4)	   11	   0.013	  (0)	   0.080	   0.16	  (0.006)	   0.051	   0.10	  (0.072)	  
Idaho	   17	   0.05	   0.52	  (0.01)	   14	   12	  (3.8)	   12	   1.2744	  (0)	   0	   0	  (0)	   0	   0.003	  
(0.002)	  
Kansas	   0.94	   0.28	   0.34	  (0.20)	   0.13	   3.0	  (2.9)	   3.0	   0.0024	  (0.0022)	   0.46	   0.89	  (0.035)	   0.037	  
0.071	  
(0.049)	  
Montana	   11	   0.12	   0.16	  (0.06)	   11	   7.6	  (1.6)	   7.6	   0.0008	  
(0.0008)	  
0.069	   0.15	  (0.001)	   0.032	   0.052	  
(0.036)	  
Nebraska	   5.5	   0.11	   0.30	  (0.13)	   1.3	   6.7	  (6.0)	   6.7	   0.023	  (0.0008)	   4.0	   0.92	  (0.014)	   0	  
0.055	  
(0.037)	  
Nevada	   1.6	   0.61	   0.42	  (0.17)	   0.93	   1.5	  (0.94)	   1.5	   0.0005	  (0)	   0	   3.4	  (0.022)	   0.024	   0.010	  (0.007)	  
New	  Mexico	   1.9	   0.04	   0.30	  (0.17)	   1.7	   2.7	  (1.5)	   2.7	   0	  (0)	   0	   0.55	  (0.025)	   0.051	   0.050	  
(0.035)	  
North	  
Dakota	   1.3	   0.05	   0.07	  (0.02)	   0.08	   0.10	  (0.09)	   0.10	   0.0006	  (0)	   1.167	  
0.052	  
(0.002)	   0.030	  
0.025	  
(0.018)	  
Oklahoma	   1.1	   0.62	   0.54	  (0.10)	   0.15	   0.77	  (0.36)	   0.77	   0.0007	  (0)	   0.031	   0.40	  (0.017)	   0.15	   0.13	  (0.087)	  
Oregon	   5.7	   0.70	   1.5	  (0.09)	   4.2	   5.5	  (2.7)	   5.5	  
0.0005	  
(0.0006)	   0	   0.15	  (0.007)	   0.008	  
0.014	  
(0.010)	  
South	  
Dakota	   0.26	   0.04	   0.09	  (0.02)	   0.16	   0.24	  (0.16)	   0.24	   0	  (0)	   0	   0.13	  (0.006)	   0	   0	  (0)	  
Texas	   18	   4.6	   4.7	  (1.4)	   1.9	   8.4	  (7.3)	   8.4	   0.015	  (0.015)	   9.2	   6.6	  (2.3)	   1.6	   0.32	  (0.23)	  
Utah	   4.4	   0.31	   0.51	  (0.18)	   4.0	   3.2	  (1.7)	   3.1	   0.082	  (0.0005)	   0	   0	  (0)	   0.050	   0.12	  (0.083)	  
Washington	   4.7	   0.89	   1.7	  (0.21)	   3.2	   5.8	  (2.5)	   5.8	   0.0007	  (0.0007)	   0.48	   0	  (0)	   0.034	  
0.044	  
(0.029)	  
Wymonig	   4.4	   0.05	   0.08	  (0.03)	   4.0	   5.9	  (2.4)	   5.9	   0.0074	  
(0.0005)	  
0.18	   0.37	  (0.003)	   0.067	   0.11	  (0.075)	  
Region	   118	   17	   18	  (4.8)	   79	   105	  (62)	   105	   1.6	  (0.050)	   16	   20	  (0.41)	   2.3	   1.5	  (1.03)	  
aIncludes	  self-­‐supplied	  water	  and	  water	  delivered	  through	  a	  public	  supply	  system.	  
bAnnual	  amount	  of	  freswater	  withdrawals	  and	  freshwater	  consumptive	  use	  in	  1995	  (USGS	  1995,	  Table	  2).	  
cPercent	  of	  diverted	  water	  that	  is	  conusmed	  in	  a	  particular	  category.	  
dAmount	  of	  surface	  water	  diverted	  in	  2005	  (USGS	  2009,	  Table	  3).	  
eAmount	  of	  freshwater	  witdrawals	  and	  freshwater	  consumtive	  use	  in	  1995	  (USGS	  1998,	  Tables	  12,	  14	  ,20).	  
fAmount	  of	  freshwater	  witdrawals	  and	  freshwater	  consumtive	  use	  in	  1995	  (USGS	  1998,	  Table	  16).	  
gAmount	  of	  freshwater	  witdrawals	  and	  freshwater	  consumtive	  use	  in	  1995	  (USGS	  1998,	  Table	  18—animal	  specialities).	  
hAmount	  of	  surface	  water	  diverted	  in	  2005	  (USGS2009,	  Table	  13).	  
iAnnual	  amount	  of	  freshwater	  withdrawals	  and	  freshwater	  consumptive	  use	  for	  thermoelectric	  cooling	  was	  computed	  from	  the	  database	  reported	  in	  Averyt	  
et	  al.	  (2013).	  Accessed	  from	  http://www.ucusa.org/clean_energy/our-­‐energy-­‐choices-­‐energy-­‐and-­‐water-­‐use/ucs-­‐power-­‐plant-­‐database,	  April	  23,	  2013.	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In recognition of these connections, states require a review to ensure that water transfers do not adversely 
affect a third party’s water right. Economic third-party effects are those impacts of a transfer transmitted 
by economic channels, such as a decrease in taxable land value or decline in farm implement store 
revenue following a water right sale. Consideration of these third-party effects varies greatly from one 
water transfer to another, even within a single state. However, all states enforce protection from physical 
third-party effects—those that affect the actual availability of water required to fulfill an existing water 
right. Transferring a water right from an agricultural user to a municipality normally involves moving the 
point of diversion and changing the timing of the diversions, creating physical third-party effects on other 
users along the river.  
 
Given that almost all water uses result in water return to streams, which are in turn used by subsequent 
users, any water transfer could cause third-party effects, and the requirement to investigate these effects 
may add several years and several hundred thousand dollars to even a small (few hundred acre feet) 
transfer. 
 
MANY	  HANDS	  HOLDING	  A	  SINGLE	  BUNDLE	  
Multiple ownership claims arising from irrigation institutions create a second hurdle to water transfers. 
Water rights arise from two actions: diverting water from a natural watercourse and putting the water to a 
beneficial use. Where a farmer owns riparian land, digs a ditch, and uses the water to irrigate, he or she is 
the sole owner of the water right—he or she is the only one holding that particular bundle of sticks. 
However, much of the water used for western irrigation is delivered through an irrigation institution in 
which an organization diverts, stores, and delivers water to a farm whose owner puts the delivered water 
to a beneficial use. Both the institution and the farmer complete one of the two actions required for 
ownership of a water right, but the courts have recognized that regardless of who owns title to the water, 
all entities involved have a considerable role in the disposition of the water right (Nevada v. United States 
563 U.S. 110, 126 (1983); United States v. Imperial Irrigation District 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977); 
Benson 1996). The consequence is that one bundle of sticks can have multiple owners with legitimate 
claims to it. Before a bundle of sticks can be sold or transferred, it must be clear who holds the right to 
transfer that bundle; all of those holding the bundle must agree to the transfer.  
 
Types and structures of irrigation institutions vary greatly, in part because of their evolution in response 
to the demands of the environment and changing economy (Bretsen and Hill 2006). In the mid-to-late 
19th century, western agricultural settlement took place in riparian areas where a lone farmer could satisfy 
his or her farm’s irrigation needs with minimal infrastructure. As agriculture expanded, irrigation water 
needed to be captured and stored to smooth out variations in need within and between years. Larger 
networks of canals were required to deliver the water to non-riparian agricultural lands. Eventually, a 
mismatch in optimal scales of water delivery and agricultural production occurred, making vertical 
integration of water delivery and farming into a single entity impractical. What developed were large 
institutions such as private “mutual ditch” companies, public districts (irrigation, conservation, 
conservancy, water supply, and so on, hereafter referred to as irrigation districts), and a federal agency 
(BOR) that could pool the capital necessary to develop large water storage and delivery projects. Farmers 
began to have water delivered through artificial ditches under contracted terms with a ditch company, 
irrigation district, or the BOR. Because the ditch, irrigation district, or BOR diverts water, and the farmer 
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puts it to beneficial use, it is unclear exactly who “owns the water,” and in many cases, the clearest 
answer is that several entities have ownership claims, or hands on the bundle of sticks (Benson 1996). 
 
Agricultural water ownership in the modern West is in fact dominated by irrigation institutions, with self-
appropriated water accounting for only 12%–39% of agricultural lands irrigated with surface water 
(Figure 2, Table 2). Between 22% and 78% of surface water-irrigated lands receive water from an 
irrigation institution, and many farms irrigate with a combination of self-appropriated and delivered water 
(Figure 2). Moreover, as a proportion of surface-water-irrigated farmland, BOR projects account for 
30%–52% of that acreage. In all states except Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming, fewer than one-third of 
surface-water-irrigated farms receive no water from an institution. In contrast, in Arizona, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, more than 50% of surface-water-irrigated 
farms receive water exclusively from an institution. Similarly, the BOR’s influence is not uniform across 
the West. In Montana and Texas, BOR water irrigates less than 20% of surface-water-irrigated farmland. 
However, BOR water irrigates more than two-thirds of similar farms in Colorado, Kansas, and 
Washington.  
 
Throughout the western United States, the bulk of irrigation water passes through some type of 
institution. There are therefore multiple ownership claims on irrigation water; the types of institutions 
involved vary. Transferring water with multiple ownership claims requires negotiating the transaction 
with the many interests involved, which increases the time and money required. 
 
Figure	  2.	  Amount	  of	  Surface-­‐Water-­‐Irrigated	  Farmland	  Irrigated	  with	  Self-­‐Appropriated	  Water	  and	  Water	  
Delivered	  through	  an	  Irrigation	  Institution.	  
 
Sources:	  Data	  from	  USGS	  2009;	  USDA	  2009a;	  and	  USDA	  2009b.	  See	  Table	  2	  for	  the	  data	  used	  to	  create	  this	  figure.	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Table	  2.	  State-­‐By-­‐State	  Breakdown	  of	  Farmland	  Irrigated	  with	  Surface	  Water	  by	  Sources.	  
	  
All	  irrigated	  
farmland	  
Farmland	  
irrigated	  
with	  surface	  
water	  
Farmland	  irrigated	  with	  
self-­‐appropriated	  surface	  
water	  
	  
Farmland	  irrigated	  with	  
surface	  water	  from	  an	  
irrigation	  institution	  
Farmland	  irrigated	  with	  
surface	  water	  from	  the	  
USBR6	  
(1000	  acres)a	   (1000	  acres)b	   (1000	  acres)c	   %	  of	  all	  SW	  
acresd	  
(1000	  acres)c	   %	  of	  all	  SW	  
acresd	  
(1000	  
acres)e	  
%	  of	  all	  SW	  
acresd	  
Arizona	   860–950	   500–730	   50–130	   8–26	   310–550	   42–110	   360	   50–73	  
California	   7,330–9,050	   2,980–5,820	   290–1,430	   5–48	   1,190–3,220	   20–108	   1,570	   27–53	  
Colorado	   2,870–3,030	   1,610–2,460	   460–720	   19–45	   820–1,090	   33–67	   1,400	   57–87	  
Idaho	   3,300–3,530	   2,120–2,750	   370–610	   14–29	   1,100–1,550	   40–73	   1,450	   53–68	  
Kansas	   2,570–3,120	   80–160	   20–50	   11–62	   30–40	   16–47	   80	   49–95	  
Montana	   1,950–2,270	   1,890–2,240	   700–830	   31–44	   920–1,070	   41–57	   400	   18–21	  
Nebraska	   8,350–8,560	   520–2,250	   10–250	   1–49	   170–440	   7–83	   480	   19–92	  
Nevada	   580–690	   320–500	   160–270	   31–86	   100–160	   20–51	   130	   26–42	  
New	  Mexico	   830–870	   290–480	   60–100	   12–34	   210–290	   45–101	   210	   45–74	  
North	  Dakota	   240–260	   80–130	   20–20	   14–27	   60–60	   44–73	   40	   34–50	  
Oklahoma	   460–530	   80–130	   30–40	   21–46	   40–50	   29–58	   50	   38–61	  
Oregon	   1,760–1,970	   1,300–1,510	   370–540	   25–42	   590–810	   39–62	   440	   29–33	  
South	  Dakota	   360–420	   150–210	   20–20	   9–15	   120–130	   60–86	   90	   43–59	  
Texas	   5,101–6,210	   670–1,340	   60–160	   5–23	   460–610	   34–90	   100	   	  7–14	  
Utah	   1,070–1,210	   910–1,090	   210–240	   19–26	   620–690	   57–76	   360	   33	  –	  39	  
Washington	   1,680–1,840	   1,240–1,510	   220–310	   15–25	   750–940	   50–75	   940	   62–76	  
Wymonig	   1,000–1,550	   890–1,430	   540–610	   38–68	   720–810	   50–90	   450	   32–51	  	  
Region	   42,210–
45,130	  
16,300–	  
28,910	  
3,590–6,320	   12–39	   8,220–	  
12,500	  
28–77	   8,560	   30–52	  
a	  Range	  of	  irrigated	  farmland	  encompasses	  the	  reported	  total	  irrigated	  acreage	  (USGS	  2009,	  Table	  7;	  USDA	  2009,	  Vol.	  3,	  Part	  
1,	  Ch.	  1,	  Table	  11;	  and	  USDA	  2009,	  Vol.	  1,	  Ch.	  2,	  Table	  10).	  
b	  Surface-­‐water-­‐irrigated	  acres	  is	  the	  range	  that	  encompasses	  (1)	  area	  estimated	  from	  USGS	  (2009,	  Table	  7)	  by	  assuming	  a	  
consistent	  water	  duty	  between	  surface	  water	  and	  ground	  water	  users,	  (2)	  area	  from	  USDA	  (2009,	  Vol.	  3,	  Ch.	  1,	  Table	  
11),subtracting	  acres	  using	  only	  groundwater	  as	  a	  source	  from	  total	  irrigated	  acres,	  and	  (3)	  area	  from	  USDA	  (2009,	  Vol.	  3,	  Part	  
1,	  Ch.	  1,	  Table	  11),	  subtracting	  acres	  using	  any	  groundwater	  as	  a	  source	  from	  total	  irrigated	  acres.	  
c	  Range	  of	  irrigated	  acres	  reported	  in	  USDA	  (2009,	  Vol.	  3,	  Part	  1,	  Ch.	  1,	  Table	  11)	  as	  using	  only	  off-­‐farm	  (on-­‐farm	  surface)	  
water	  and	  as	  using	  any	  off-­‐farm	  (on-­‐farm	  surface)	  water.	  
d	  The	  percentage	  of	  total	  surface-­‐water	  irrigated	  acreage	  in	  each	  category	  is	  computed	  assuming	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	  
numerator	  and	  denominator.	  
e	  The	  USBR-­‐irrigated	  acres	  by	  state	  were	  estimated	  from	  the	  irrigated	  acres	  reported	  for	  each	  project	  at	  
222.usbr.gov/projects/.	  The	  apportionment	  of	  multi-­‐state	  projects	  was	  estimated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  reported	  project	  area.	  
Project-­‐level	  data	  are	  available	  at	  http://sites.nicholas.duke.edu/charlespodolak/files/2014/04/BoR_Projects_by_State.xslx.	  
f	  The	  USBR	  reports	  delivering	  water	  to	  10	  million	  acres	  of	  farmland	  (http://www.usbr.gov/main/abount/),	  compared	  with	  8.6	  
million	  acres	  by	  our	  accounting.	  
	  
IMPLICATIONS	  
Addressing	  Third-­‐Party	  Effects	  
The requirement to assess third-party effects is a government-imposed requirement in all western states. 
A common refrain from those advocating for water market reform is to reduce government interference 
(Gould 1988; Anderson and Snyder 1997). For instance, one proposal would allow a water user to own 
the entire amount that the user diverted, not just the amount consumptively used (Meyers and Posner 
1971). This approach would remove third-party concerns, because no junior downstream user could claim 
to have rights to water that a senior user was justified to consumptively use. However, the approach 
would transform a central tenant of prior appropriation water law that one can earn a right to only as 
much water as one can beneficially put to use. Allowing a user to divert arbitrarily large quantities, to 
beneficially use a portion, and to continue to claim the remaining return flow could lead to hoarding, 
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speculation, and monopolies. Altering the water rights system in such a way to define away third-party 
effects cannot be accomplished without fundamentally altering the basis of western water law.  
A more viable approach is to acknowledge third-party effects but to improve the methods used by states 
to assess such effects. To that end, states could establish clear and consistent guidelines defining the level 
of certainty required by a party showing no third-party effects and outlining accepted methods to 
demonstrate the lack of effects. For instance, the Wyoming Board of Control requires that a proposed 
transferer demonstrate with “clear and convincing evidence” that no other water users will be injured by 
the transfer, even when there are no claims of injury (Gould 1988). In contrast, Colorado requires that a 
transferer need only to rebut claims of injury proposed by other water users (City of Colorado Springs v. 
Yust 249 P.2d 151 (1952)). The lower standard used by Colorado should place a lower third-party effects 
burden on transfers, and thus if applied across the western United States, it would increase the potential 
for water markets. 
 
An additional approach would be for states to adopt standard assumptions and methods for consumptive 
use and return flow calculations (Western Governors Association 2012). One example for consumptive 
use standardization is Montana’s codified standard assumption of evapotranspiration based on the 
location used in estimating historic consumptive use (Mont. Code Ann. §36.12.1902). Return flow 
calculations could be standardized using generally accepted methods of groundwater modeling and 
surface water interaction. This modeling is essential because much of agricultural return flow occurs 
through groundwater recharge, and transferees are required to maintain historic return flows. States could 
standardize the process by developing such a model or by adopting an existing one.  
There is no getting around third-party effects on water transfers, although the process of evaluating the 
effects can be improved and streamlined. Yet even when more efficient, the process of addressing third-
party effects will require an investment of time and money. 
 
Addressing	  Institutional	  Effects	  
Most of the agricultural water in the western United States is delivered through an irrigation institution, 
creating multiple ownership claims on that water. Because there are multiple hands holding the bundle of 
sticks, transferring this water through markets requires negotiating the transaction with multiple parties.  
Whether dealing with a private ditch company or a public irrigation district, a transfer will be subject to 
approval of a governing board. An approval for a transfer of water outside an institution’s boundaries can 
be a time consuming, expensive, and subject to broad community interests and influences. When a market 
transaction may be financially beneficial to an individual farmer, the governing board is often responsive 
to a broad set of interests, such as a local community that is dependent on continued irrigated agriculture, 
and may be hostile to any transfers. Because irrigation districts have a variety of voting structures, the 
relative importance of farmers’ views vis-à-vis the rest of the community is quite variable. The 
economists McDowell and Ugone have shown variations in behaviors of irrigation districts based on their 
voting structure, and differences in voting structure have been used to explain the differences in water 
transfers between the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California’s (Met) two southern California 
irrigation districts: the Imperial Irrigation District and the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID) 
(McDowell and Ugone 1982; Glennon 2009). Regardless of its internal structure, an irrigation 
organization is an additional fist on the bundle of sticks and, hence, another hurdle for a market 
transaction of water rights.  
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Multiple strategies have been applied, with various levels of success, to gain the necessary governing 
board approval. One is an outright purchase by an entity wishing to acquire irrigation water of enough 
property in a district or a ditch company to gain sufficient voting rights on the governing board to approve 
the transfer; this strategy has been referred to as the hostile takeover strategy (MacDonnell 1999). One 
case in which this strategy failed is the 1992 attempted buyout of the Fort Lyon Canal Company on the 
Lower Arkansas River, Colorado, by the Colorado Interstate Gas Company (MacDonnell 1999).  
A second strategy is to gain board approval by providing community development funds that offset the 
potential negative economic impacts on the community associated with the water transfer. An example of 
this strategy is the $6 million contribution made by Met to a community improvement fund in the Palo 
Verde area to gain approval for water transfer from the PVID and “to offset any potential economic 
impacts from the (transfer) program.”2 
 
A third strategy involves rotational fallowing, in which many farmers fallow portions of their field rather 
than ceasing all farm operation. Although this strategy reduces the total amount of agriculture lands in 
production at any point in time, it may reduce the impact on the broad agricultural community because it 
keeps the same number of farms in operation over time. The aforementioned Met-PVID transfer also used 
this approach: willing participants could voluntarily fallow between 7% and 29% of their land in a given 
year for which Met would pay the landowner for each acre out of production. Met would then receive the 
water allotment that otherwise would have gone to irrigate the land (Glennon 1999).  
 
These strategies to gain board approval have resulted in some successful transfers, yet there is risk that in 
the end the transfer will not be approved. Irrigators in the Lower Arkansas Valley have been attempting 
since 2003 to create a rotational fallowing program called the Super Ditch (following the example of the 
MET-PVID transaction); it has yet to come to fruition. Much of western irrigation water is tied up in one 
kind of institution or another; because of institutional hurdles, water transfers will require time and money 
and always be subject to political uncertainty. 
	  
CONCLUSION	  
Because of the peculiar nature of water rights, we should look to market-based transactions as a way to 
reallocate scarce water resources. Consequently, we need to accept that market transfers of water rights 
will take years, not because of onerous government regulations, but because of the need to untangle the 
hydrologic interconnectedness of water rights and the institutional connectedness of irrigators and 
delivery institutions.  
 
Water in the western United States can be bought and sold, but the transactions will always be 
complicated. Transfers of water will always be expensive and time consuming because of the hydrologic 
and institutional interconnections inherent to water. Our data show that most of the water rights in the 
West are messy. Therefore, markets cannot be quick fixes, and using markets for future water allocation, 
even if it is economically efficient, will take time and resources to set up.  
 
Untangling serial uses and negotiating multiple ownership claims are hurdles, not barriers, and they can 
be overcome in time but will require both time and money. Buying existing water rights may be less 
                                                      
2 See http://www.mwdh2o.com/mwdh2o/pages/news/at_a_glance/Palo-Verde-fact-Sheet.pdf, accessed June 11, 2014. 
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costly than building infrastructure to transport available water from long distances or desalinating 
seawater, but the transactions will come at a price. Municipalities may purchase water from farmers and 
thus bear the transaction costs directly, or the private sector may purchase agricultural water (e.g., Two 
Rivers Water and Farming, Colorado (Landry 2012)), bear the associated risk and transaction costs, and 
sell it on to municipalities. In either case, the end users will inevitably pay higher prices for water.  
Markets can and will be part of western U.S. water allocation, but they do not provide quick solutions. 
Droughts can focus public attention on the value of water and potentially increase the willingness-to-pay 
prices that reflect the transaction costs of tangled western water markets. 
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